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Ralph D. Christy 
Issues concerning the economics of information including theoretical development, public 
investments, and private use, have received considerable attention· from the agricultural 
economics profession. The American Agricultural Economics Association established the 
Committee on Economic Statistics in 1969 and since that time principal papers, a presidential 
address, organized symposia, and national conferences have focused on improving agricultural 
and rural statistical systems. The AAEA recently established yet another taskforce on economic 
and environmental data needs. Several developments have heightened interest and awareness 
of the inadequacy of our present information system: a) certain costs of information and 
information systems have risen while others have declined dramatically; b) income distributional 
impacts of differently structured information systems have begun to be recognized; c) increasing 
number of questions about what types of data should be provided by the public and private 
sectors; d) a growing realization that our ability to conceptualize often is limited by data; and 
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e) related to the above, an expanding awareness exists that the economics profession may have 
relied too heavily on deductive analysis without proper concern for the relevance of the data base 
(Bonnen 1975, Eisgruber 1978, Streeter 1988, Duncan et al. 1993). 
One widely accepted aSPect of the recent debate on information is that we have neither 
the theory nor methods for solving informational problems. These theoretical and 
methodological shortcomings are particularly evident in our inability to value information and, 
when user burden is considered, it is not clear that we can accurately.measure the costs of 
producing certain types of information. The problem of attaching costs and benefits to 
information has implications for public managers of statistical systems who are faced with 
shrinking budgets (Figure 1) and private market participants who are confronted with alternative 
marketing decisions under uncertainty. 1 
Much of the theoretical work on the economics of information has attempted to equate 
marginal cost with marginal benefits. Unfortunately, this approach has resulted in few 
empirical results that are useful. At the same time, relatively little conceptual work has focused 
on information and market organization. The purpose of this paper is to provide a conceptual 
understanding of the costs and benefits for public and private acquisition of information under 
alternative market structures. This analysis will show that due to market structure, the 
investment incentives and cost structures for information can be very different for private firms 
as compared to public agencies. 
Before presenting arguments concerning information and market structure, four major 
forces -- legal, technological, ethical, and economic -- influencing the collection, management, 
and disclosure of information are described. The balance of the paper expands discussion on 
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Figure 1. Federal Statistical Agency Budgets, US Department of 
Agriculture, National Agricultural Statistics Service, 
Economic Research Service, 1970-1994 (in millions) 
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the economics of information by conceptualizing the relationships between market structure and 
information. To help illustrate this conceptual relation of how the costs and benefits of 
information to public agents and private firms vary across market structures, four hypothetical 
cases are considered. The implications of this analysis for agricultural economists interested in 
the study of food and agricultural markets are then developed. 
Forces Influencing the Management of Public Statistical Systems 
In a free society, the management of public information systems .increasingly involves 
tradeoffs between the public right to know (accessibility to information) and the private interest 
of individuals and businesses (confidentiality). This balancing of tradeoffs, to include other 
issues related to the management of public information systems, is influenced by, at least, four 
major forces: legal, technological, ethical, and economic (Figure 2). These prime forces can 
act independent of one another but are often interrelated in their combined influence on 
managers of public statistical systems. For example, a change in technology, i.e. the 
introduction of computers, presents new legal questions about ownership of property rights and 
also has implications for the economics (costs) of certain information systems. Moreover, legal 
and ethical considerations are often in conflict for individuals in a society which promotes 
freedom of information. Below, I briefly describe each of these influences and indicate areas 
of concern for the federal statistical system. 
Legal 
For the purposes of this discussion, legal forces influencing the management of public 
-
statistics includes legislative policies (government wide) and administrative procedures (agency 
specific) adopted by statistical agencies (Table 1). Both formal and routine sets of rules provide 
I .
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Table 1:	 Milestone Legislation and Administrative Procedures Governing Collection, 
Management, and Disclosure of Federal Statistics 
Legislation: 
The Freedom of Information Act 1966 
(5 USC 522) 
The Privacy Act 1974 (5 USC 522a) 
Paperwork Reduction Act 1980 
(p.L. 96-511) 
Computer Matching and Privacy 
Protection Act 1988 (P.L. 100-503) 
American Technology Preeminence Act 1991 
Designed to facilitate access of individuals 
government data, records, and procedures. 
Designed to prevent disclosure of data on 
persons and to provide a mechanism for 
persons to verify the accuracy of 
government records. 
Designed to reduce response burden of 
individuals and businesses. 
Regulates the use of computer matching of 
federal records subject to the Privacy Act. 
Requires federal agencies to transfer to the 
National Technical Information Service 
(NIlS) copies of federally funded research to 
be organized and marketed to the public 
(academic and industry). 
USDA Statistical Agencies Administrative Procedures: 
National Agricultural Statistics 
Service (NASS) 
Standard for Suppressing Data Due 
to Confidentiality Policy and 
Standard Memoranda on 12-89, 
July 12, 1989. 
Economic Research Service (ERS) 
ERS Policy on Dissemination of 
Statistical Information, 
September 28, 1989 
Sources:	 Thomas B. labine. 1993. Statistical Disclosure Limitation Practices of United 
States Statistical Agencies. Journal of Official Statistics 9(2):427-54. 
George T. Duncan, Thomas B. Jabine and Virginia A. deWolf. 1993. Private 
Lives and Public Policies: Confidentiality and Accessibility of Government 
Statistics. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press. 
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guidance for managers of statistical systems. The Privacy Act of 1974 (5 U.S.C. § 552a) was 
the first attempt by Congress to provide comprehensive protection of an individual's right to 
privacy by setting rules governing the collection, management, and disclosure of personal 
information maintained by public statistical agencies (Cecil 1993). The Freedom of Information 
Act (5 U.S.C. § 552), specifies disclosure conditions for agencies to provide individual citizens 
access to government data. On the surface, these laws appear contradictory or, at best, reflect 
a trade-off between access to government records and confid~ntiality. The Panel on 
Confidentiality and Data Access (Duncan et al. 1993) rejected the notion of such "trade-offs," 
asserting that across certain statistical agencies the mission varies greatly and so the access­
confidentiality tradeoff issue may be seen instead as a "win/no lose" proposition. Therefore, 
both public law and administrative procedures are major influences on the management of 
federal statistics. 
Ethics 
Ethics is concerned with the right and wrong of a given action with the purpose of 
identifying principles that guide behavior. What is right or wrong is governed by the ethos of 
society. Since statistical agencies are governmental institutions, to varying degrees, these 
agencies reflect the ethos of society. The Panel on Confidentiality and Data Access considered 
the question "What principles should guide statistical agencies?". The principles of democratic 
accountability, constitutional empowerment, and individual autonomy underlie the ethics of 
American society and provide valuable ethical guidance for the structure and practice of federal 
statistical agencies. Democratic accountability "recognizes the responsibilities of those who 
serve or represent others" (Duncan et al. 1993, 25). Constitutional empowerment refers to the 
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capability of citizens to make informed decisions about public policy and private issues. 
Individual autonomy "refers to the capacity and right of the individual to perform in society as 
an individual, uncoerced and cloaked by privacy" (Duncan et al., 27). These combined ethical 
principles influence the management of public statistical systems, for these principles define the 
rights and responsibilities of individuals in a free society. 
Technology 
Technology refers to the capabilities that humans possess for improving their material 
welfare and for performing tasks in ways that involve less effort or are more efficient. Rapid 
changes in the computation and communication capacity within society have expanded the 
demand for data. This heightened demand for statistics places greater pressure on managers of 
public statistical systems. Technology made it feasible to have easy access to data banks and 
thus issues surrounding confidentiality of information intensify, further influencing the 
management of public statistical systems. 
Economic 
Economic forces influencing the management of public statistical systems take on two­
related sub-issues. First, public support of federal statistical systems influences greatly the 
functions of statistical agencies. In fiscal 1992, slightly over $900 million was budgeted for 
federal statistical agencies. Figure 3 illustrates the distribution of this budget across the various 
governmental agencies. Second, at a theoretical level, economics influences the management 
of statistical agencies when costs and returns on investments in information are evaluated. The 
balance of this paper expands discussion of these economic considerations. ­
$77.2 National Center for Education Statistics $22.1 Bureau of Justice Statistics 
$79.7 National Center for Health S 
~ 
$26.8 Statistics of Income, ms
 
$34.7 Bureau of Economic Analysis
 
Figure 3. Principal Federal Statistical Agencies (funding in millions) 
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The Economics of Information 
Two variables are of fundamental importance for the decision maker: resources and 
information. Traditionally economic theory has dealt with the problem of resource allocation 
among competing uses by assuming that information is equally distributed at no cost among all 
individuals of an economic system (i.e., that all individuals possess perfect knowledge). It 
becomes immediately apparent that traditional economic theory does not adequately address 
information problems; they are simply assumed away. A more specific ~ritique of the theory, 
suggested by Demsetz, questions a comparison of resource allocation produced under a state of 
perfect knowledge with those produced under a state of imperfect knowledge. Since imperfect 
knowledge is often regarded as a distortion, it becomes difficult, if not impossible, to separate 
the effect of imperfect knowledge from the resulting conclusions of a theory based on perfect 
knowledge. 
Some economists have attempted to adjust for this problem by viewing information as 
an economic good or commodity (Arrow 1962). And like any other good, information becomes 
subject to demand and supply analysis. But unlike traditional marketable commodities, 
information exhibits a set of characteristics that invalidate the usefulness of a competitive 
equilibrium analysis; information possesses the characteristics of a public good. 
In the Samuelson-Musgrave definition, a public good is characterized by 1) nonrivalness, 
or jointness in supply and utilization, and 2) nonexcludability. The first attribute implies that 
the good is equally available to all. The second implies that it is impossible for private 
producers to appropriate through market pricing the full social benefits arising directly from 
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production or use of the good. That is to say. it is difficult to exclude from utilization of the 
good those who do not pay for it--the so called free rider problem. 
The public good characteristics of information present a problem on the demand side of 
the information market (Riemenschneider 1977). Arrow (p. 616) states that similar problems 
of indivisibility and undervaluation exist for the users of information: 
.. ,there is a fundamental paradox in the determination of the demand for 
information; its value to the purchaser is not known until he has the information. 
but then he has in effect acquired it without cost. 
These problems are clearly serious for those who wish to use neoclassical supply-demand 
theory for analyses of informational phenomena. Quoting from Marshak et a1. (p. 9): 
They lead to severe doubts concerning the optimality of the information market 
in itself and more generally to a view that--when knowledge production is 
introduced into an economy then neither for the simple competitive mechanism 
nor for any simple modification of it is the optimality of equilibrium preserved, 
and even the existence of equilibrium is doubtful. 
Market Organization and Infonnation: Some Conceptual Insights 
The industrial organization (I/O) framework (Bain 1968) may have application to the 
study of market information. The paradigm seeks to establish a relationship between the 
structure of an industry, its firms, behavior, and the resulting economic performance. The 
framework has been applied to a number of issues concerning market organization. This 
framework may provide insight into the nature of information and perhaps gives some indication 
of its value to decision makers. 
Intuition suggests that the relationship between information and each component of the 
-
I/O framework runs in two directions (Figure 4). Information influences market structure, but 
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a given structural characteristic of a market can govern the flow and distribution of information. 
Information influences the behavior (conduct) of the firm, but the firm can reduce its needs for 
information by adopting various risk management practices which allow it to make decisions in 
an environment of imperfect knowledge. Information can be associated with market 
performance, but, conversely, the performance of a market can have an impact on information 
within that market. Thus, this relationship becomes circular. Although a dynamic relationship 
between the I/O framework and information is theorized, it becomes mor~ manageable to trace 
connections between the two in a single direction. That is, one can hold the structural and 
behavioral dimensions of the market constant, and question what impact various elements of the 
I/O framework have on the distribution and, perhaps, value of information in the firm's decision 
making process and in public policy use. 
It should be noted that the I/O framework has at least two limitations for analyzing 
informational problems. Applications of the I/O framework have traditionally de-emphasized 
1) vertical market relationships, and 2) the behavior of the firm's decision process. The former 
has implications for the structural characteristics of a market while the later relates to market 
conduct. 
Information is a product of exchange, and exchange within markets can take place in both 
horizontal and vertical dimensions. But traditionally, industrial organization theory has been 
applied only to horizontal market relationships. Several researchers, including Williamson, 
Henderson, Marion, and Shaffer have attempted to integrate and combine vertical coordination 
-

with I/O theory. They have all recognized that the I/O paradigm has important applications to 
the study of vertical market relationships and the coordination of these systems in addition to 
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earlier research applications to a single industry. Developments in this area will have 
implications for research on information systems because more information (for both private and 
public purposes) is transferred via vertical market transactions than horizontal ones. 
Researchers argue that the I/O framework omits an important aspect of reality: the 
framework does not consider the firm's decision environment. The I/O framework has 
concentrated on conditions external to the firm, i.e. definition of the relevant market. Thus, it 
has treated the firm like a "black box." Shaffer calls for linking tbe I/O framework with the 
bodies of knowledge developed by organizational behavioralists (Simon 1975, Cyert and March 
1977) whose primary concern commences with intrafirm decision-making. This line of 
reasoning would not only add to I/O theory, but would also make it possible to investigate the 
relationship between the firm's decision process and information. IfI/O theory does not account 
for the firm's decision making environment, one cannot expect it to accommodate notions related 
to information. 
While market structure and market conduct can have substantial impact on the design of 
information systems, an association between information and market performance may also have 
important application to the study of information. Several studies have attempted to link 
information to selected dimensions of market performance such as price stability (Houck and 
Pearson 1978) and price dispersion (Devine and Marion 1979). The difficulty in following this 
line of reasoning lies in the fact that market performance is a multidimensional concept. 
Moreover, care must be taken in designing the research such that information impacts on market 
performance can be separated from other factors which may influence the performance of the 
market. 
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The relationships between market structure and information are the primary concern of 
this paper. I will proceed by using four hypothetical cases to examine the distribution of 
acquisition costs and of information benefits between private firms and public agencies across 
alternative market structures. 
Impacts of Market Structure on the Costs and Benefits of Acquiring Infonnation by Private 
Firms and Public Agents 
Because the value of information is only realized ex post, p,ublic or private returns on 
investments in information are difficult to estimate. It may be reasonable for a decision maker 
to concentrate on minimizing the costs associated with acquiring information. Sporleder (p. 392) 
observes that: "... the largest information cost component for a typical firm is likely that 
associated with acquisition of information through contact and communication." But under other 
market conditions, private decision makers can realize direct benefits from information. Both 
costs and benefits of information shape the behavior of decision makers. To help illustrate this 
point, hypothetical cases of information costs and benefits for private firms and for public 
statistical agencies under four different market structures and exchange mechanisms can be 
considered. 
For the purpose of this presentation, a special meaning of market information is used. 
In the strictest sense, we know that market signals are not information per se because they have 
not been analyzed nor interpreted to serve a specific decision.2 Economists marvel over the 
signaling function which prices play under perfectly competitive market conditions. But outside 
of this set of preconditions, the limitations of the informational content of prices are well 
documented (Collins 1959). Just identifies two classifications of information in relation to the 
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phenomena measured: (1) market data, including prices and direct measures of supply and 
demand data and (2) structural data defined as "a broad term intended to include data on 
income, employment, productivity, nutrition, distribution of resources, etc. It He further 
distinguishes the two by asserting that "market data are supplied from both public and private 
sources" and used primarily by firms in making marketing decisions. Structural data are 
primarily produced by public statistical agencies and used by public policy makers. 
Nevertheless, when exchange occurs within a market, information is.always present. Questions 
arise as to: Who has access or rights to this information? How are costs and benefits from its 
use distributed? Why do public statistical agencies and private firms behave so differently with 
respect to information distribution and use under different market structures? 
To the extent that the distribution of market information varies over market structures, 
it is reasonable to assume that costs and benefits are also distributed differently among various 
market participants. Even within the same market structure, the total cost of producing 
information varies among organizations for a number of reasons including, for example, size of 
organization, purpose of organization, management styles, analytical capabilities and methods 
of accounting for costs (Burch 1979). Because of its public good characteristics, the 
measurement of benefits from information becomes equally difficult. 
Hypothetical Cases 
The following assumptions are made for each of the four hypothetical cases: 1) Within 
each market structure, one hundred percent of the market volume is transacted under the 
exchange mechanism associated with that structure; 2) Both buyers and sellers in the market face ­
the same market structures (symmetric markets); 3) Firms are not required by law to report 
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information to the public statistical agents; 4) The nature and type of information needed for 
decision making changes over various structures. 
The conceptual framework considers a series of four hypothetical cases. Each 
hypothetical case examines how acquisition costs of information are distributed between the firm 
and the public statistical agent under the specified market structure and associated price exchange 
mechanism. The following market structures and associated price discovery mechanisms are 
considered: 1) competitive market/auction; 2) oligopoly/contract; 3) monqpoly/ bargaining; and 
4) single firm market/vertical integration. 
In the first case, we examine the costs and benefits of information to the public agency 
and to the private firm(s) in a competitive market. A public auction is a close approximation 
to the competitive market. In this case, it is hypothesized that the public agent and the private 
firm would both incur relatively low costs for obtaining information. Why? The competitive 
market with its assumption of many buyers and sellers (etc), especially in the case of a public 
auction as the exchange mechanism, presents no problem for a participant or a neutral agent in 
obtaining accurate and representative market information by merely participating in or observing 
the centrally located auction process (a characteristic of such information is nonexcludability). 
The public agency faces relatively modest costs in this case, compared to what it faces under 
other market structures. Informational costs are no higher and are often lower for the firm, but 
as one competitive firm among many, it finds it difficult to capture any return on its investments 
in information. The firm is "regulated" by the market and, to the extent that the market is able 
to supply an adequate amount of reasonably accurate information, the firm's investment in 
information acquisition is low. Since no private firm has an incentive to provide the information 
-
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needed to facilitate the coordination of the market, the public statistical agency, while facing. the 
same relative low costs, has the capacity to generate very high social return to society (Hayami 
and Peterson 1972). 
As we move to a more concentrated market structure and associated exchange 
mechanism, oligopoly and contracts, we encounter higher information acquisition costs for the 
public agency and perhaps slightly lower information cost for the private firm for several 
reasons. 3 While there are fewer firms in the market, the cost of informati.on to the public agent 
is higher because the private contract pricing mechanism is substituted for the open market 
auction, thus reducing the amount of readily available market information. Proprietary rights 
in market information are heightened. It is in the individual firm's interest to withhold 
information so that it maintains a competitive advantage over other firms in the market. 
Information ceases to be a product of the public processes of the market and becomes more an 
internal firm product of a publicly unrecorded private transaction between firms. But, even if 
the contracting firms should voluntarily report to the public agent, the complex and differing 
specifics of each of the many contracts would create major formatting and disseminating costs. 
Also, much of the coordination of the market follows from the fewness of firms and their 
interdependence in behavior, reducing the benefits to society or consumers of any public 
investment in market information. Under this market structure, the firm still faces about the 
same information costs, but the potential net benefit to an oligopolistic firm is higher. Because 
of the very nature of the market, particularly in cases where there are few firms, a firm can use 
information internal to its operations to arrive at estimates of the entire market. Moreover, as ­
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an oligopolist, the firm recognizes that it can capture more return on its investments in market 
information. 
Next, the monopoly structure, with bargaining as the exchange mechanism, is considered. 
In this case it is expected that the public agent will experience substantially higher information 
acquisition costs and the firm will incur still lower information acquisition costs. All market 
information is now a product of the internal decisions of the bilateral monopolists. The public 
agent's information costs are likely to be even higher relative to other market structures because 
of the obstacle of the firm's entrenched property rights to information. Information held by the 
firm is reported only if the firm is required by law (i.e. subpoena) to report because of some 
prevailing public concern (see assumption 3). Consequently, the public agent's cost of acquiring 
market information becomes extremely high. However, potentially high social benefits for such 
public investment exist, though these returns are derived from public policies regulating firm 
behavior, not for facilitating market coordination. The coordination function, which is 
performed by the firms, is entirely internal to the monopolies. These two firms are in full 
control of all market information. Exchange between the bilateral monopolists is facilitated by 
bargaining. Although the bargaining may be inefficient for the monopolists, the cost of 
acquiring market information is lower for these firms than it is for firms in other market 
structures since most "market" information is part of the internal records of the bilateral 
monopolists. Once again, because of the inherent structural characteristics of the market, the 
firm has low informational cost and can realize high private benefits from information. 
In the final case, the situation of a single firm economy, no market transactions are 
examined. The firm performs internal transactions through vertica~ integration. Although the 
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potential social benefits of publicly supplied information are high, the acquisition cost of 
information for the public agent is prohibitively high. The cost to the firm for access to 
information becomes extremely low. Vertical integration enables the firm to realize economies 
of information exchange (Williamson 1971). While information processing, managing, and 
analyzing costs may be high, the acquisition cost of market information is nil, and the advantage 
and benefits in the control over distribution of information, especially with respect to public 
versus private use, resides in the private firm's domain. 
Implications for Public Investment in Infonnation and Needed Research on Public 
Infonnation Systems and Food Markets 
As one moves from case to case in the purely hypothetical examples above, market 
concentration and the public agent costs of market information increase greatly, while the costs 
of market information for the private firm decrease. As market concentration increases, the 
firm's information acquisition costs decline and returns on the firm's investments in market 
information increase greatly, providing a major incentive for the firm to invest in information 
and to deny access to public agents and to competing firms in the market. For the public agent, 
the social benefits to public investments in information to facilitate market coordination decline 
rapidly as concentration increases, while benefits from information for public policy and 
regulatory decisions grow. Thus, the purpose of public investment in market information 
changes drastically. 
The above framework attempts to explain why private market participants invest in 
market information differently than public statistical agents over various market structures. The ­
framework suggests that the cost of information, defined as a function of accessibility to 
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information, is a major factor in determining informational investments on the part of both 
private and public decision makers because the value of information is, at best, difficult to 
determine. Thus, an individual decision maker faced with uncertainty will attempt to minimize 
the cost of acquiring information. 
The effect of market structure on investments in market information can be perhaps best 
illustrated when one considers the early 1980's reductions in the public statistical budget. The 
federal statistical budget is estimated to have been reduced by 20 percent in real terms between 
1980 and 1983 (Slater 1982). The budget cut in federal statistics altered the data production 
efforts of the United States Department of Agriculture, Statistical Reporting Service (SRS) in 
at least three ways: (1) approximately 27 agricultural-related and crop reports were eliminated, 
(2) some state level estimates were discontinued, and (3) data series were eliminated for several 
fruit and vegetable crops (Gardner 1983). More recently, reductions in federal support of 
agricultural statistical agencies have altered the effectiveness of their ability to respond to new 
societal challenges such as those relations to rural development, environmental policy and 
international economics (Johnson and Bonnen 1991). The public data and informational output 
has been reduced on a wide-range of economic and social issues while demands for new data 
have burgeoned (environmental baseline data, immigration impacts on labor markets, effects of 
global competition on rural economies, etc.). 
The statistical budget cut starting in the early 1980's have had different distributional 
impacts between the production of market data and structural data. Just (p. 874) observes the 
"structural data-gathering efforts seem to be hardest hit by budget cuts." He cites the Office of ­
, 
Information and Regulatory Affairs, Statistical Policy Branch by stating program changes were 
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made to improve data on crop and livestock production, stock of farm commodities, and data 
for crop forecasting while special purpose surveys will be either phased out or scaled down. 
Gardner further notes that the most notable loss of data is the socio-economic statistics that were 
moved to follow-on surveys in 1974 and were eliminated in 1982. Public investments in the 
production of structural data, are unlikely to be replaced by private investments. In the cases 
where private firms would invest in structural data, a return would only accrue to the private 
sector. Thus, non-price data or information on more concentrated Vlarkets would be lost. 
Why have we observed a larger reduction of public funds for the production of structural 
data? Reduced public expenditures for producing structural data, as opposed to market data, 
may be explained, in part, by the theory of information acquisition cost and market structure 
developed above. As we move away from the competitive norm, non-price information becomes 
more valuable, albeit more difficult to quantify, to both public and private decision makers. 
Because of the structural characteristics of the market, the acquisition cost of structural 
information becomes more costly for the public agent and less costly for the firm. The relatively 
high cost of acquiring structural information, given the unquantifiable benefits of this investment, 
may explain why public expenditures for the production of structural data have been reduced. 
Conversely, because of the inability to measure the value of information and, given its relative 
lower acquisition costs in competitive markets, we may experience an over-production of 
publicly provided market data. 
These comparative cases provide hypothetical examples based on theory of how 
acquisition costs and benefits are distributed between the private firm and the public agent over ­
various market structures and exchange mechanisms. As markets grow more concentrated, the 
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need of publicly supported information for the purposes of improving private market decisions 
(market efficiency) will decline. This phenomenon does not necessarily lessen the need to 
collect public information so much as it suggests a need for public market information to 
preserve competitive market forces. Market organization and informational properties are 
important to the design of a publicly supported statistical system. The structural characteristics 
of a market may serve as criteria for determining public investments in information; the amount 
and kind of information that decision makers demand is related to the st~cture/organization of 
markets. This hypothesis requires further empirical testing. 
The lack of data on many segments of the U.S. food marketing system will no doubt have 
an effect on research methods of applied economists interested in studying food marketing 
problems. Current thinking requires more dependence on markets, while at the same time, 
markets are deferring larger shares of economic activity to firms (Christy 1993). Stiglitz argues 
that now more economic activity is occurring within organizations than within open-market 
pricing systems. If agricultural economists are to be of service to private and public 
decisionmakers , an improved understanding of the strategic behavior of the modern firm must 
be acquired. 
L_ 
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ENDNOTES 
1.	 Personal interviews with Richard Allen from NASS/USDA and Edward Spar of Council 
of Professional Association on Federal Statistics improved my understanding of the 
current policy environment in which managers of Federal Statistical Agencies operate. 
Richard Allen provided data which is presented in Figures 1 and 3 of this paper. 
2.	 In his Presidential address to the American Agricultural Economics Association, James 
T. Bonnen makes the case that data are not information until they were analyzed and 
placed within a specific decision context. 
3.	 Care must be taken in presenting the few-firm industry case as it relates to the acquisition 
cost of market information. Several models of imperfect competition exist and each has 
a different set of implications for the distribution of acquisition costs between firms in 
the market and between private market firms and the public statistical agent. The 
arguments presented in this case subscribe to the dominant firm model of the imperfect 
competitive market. 
-
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